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 ABSTRACT
 This paper examines that the impact of firm-specific characteristic on firm capital structure in
 Chinese-listed companies and attempts to solve a few puzzles existing in previous related studies.
 The key factors include state ownership, institutional ownership, and the risk of default. From the
 analyses of all samples, our results confirm that the expected default risk is important in explaining
 debt decision, but the influence of ownership structure is not significant. However, after separating
 high- and low-level from the firm leverage we find that the ownerships of state and institutions
 have a positive effect on corporate leverage in high-leveraged companies but not in low-leveraged
 firms. In addition, the positive impacts of external governance commonly occur in large firms. The
 observed findings provide some important implications for the role of external governance in
 Chinese-listed companies.
 JEL Classifications: G32
 Keywords: Capital Structure, Expected Default Risk, State Ownership; Institutional Ownership
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 INTRODUCTION
 Booth et al. (2001) investigate capital structure determinants for ten developing countries,
 not including China, and find that the effects of the various factors on capital structure
 differ across countries, with the exception of profitability. It is interesting to explore how
 these influential factors affect the leverage decisions taken by Chinese firms, as China is
 the largest developing country and the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) receiver in
 the world today (Sun and Tong, 2003). China is a rising star, and has attracted huge
 quantities of foreign capital since its capital markets were opened up to investors around
 the world in the 1990s. A large number of foreign investors have given rise to a huge
 capital inflow, not only in terms of infrastructure, but also in capital markets, and
 especially in the stock market. Such increases in foreign capital, however, might affect
 the corporate capital structure and further affect corporate investment decisions. In
 addition, while China has gradually lifted a ban in relation to its capital markets and is
 gradually moving towards a market economy, it is essentially still a command economy,
 and hence the government is usually the largest shareholder and even the controlling
 shareholder in many enterprises. This is a distinguishing feature of the ownership
 structure of Chinese firms compared to corresponding firms in the emerging and
 developed markets.
 The major difference in terms of capital structure between China and other countries
 might be associated with the higher degree of state ownership. In general, the managers
 of most firms with a high degree of state ownership are ineffectively monitored, and
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 hence the agency cost is higher than in firms with less state ownership. In an attempt to
 reduce the agency cost, firms have the propensity to raise more debt as a financing
 channel.1 In addition, the high degree of state ownership can help increase the leverage
 capacity of firms because of the guarantee provided by the government. Therefore, state
 ownership could be positively related to firm leverage. On the other hand, funds are
 needed for the transition from command economy to market economy in China. As
 mentioned above, the numbers of foreign investors and institutional investors in China
 have been increasing since 1990. Institutional investors are in general better at
 monitoring their executives, and accordingly have lower agency costs (McConnell and
 Servaes, 1990; Pound, 1991); thus, they are expected to exhibit a negative relationship
 with leverage. Marked differences exist between China and other developed countries in
 terms of the degree of state ownership and the abundance of FDI in Chinese companies,
 which might lead to the capital structure of Chinese firms being different from firms in
 other countries.
 Our motivation for studying the capital structure of Chinese firms arises mainly
 from the exceptional ownership structure in China. The first question this paper addresses
 is whether state ownership affects the capital structure of Chinese firms. Additionally, the
 Chinese economy is still in a stage of transition and is an emerging market, and firms in
 emerging markets may face more uncertainty in terms of their returns. Consequently,
 from the perspective of risk management, we investigate how the manager of a Chinese
 firm decides upon the company's debt policies in the face of speedy expansion of the
 economic environment, as the risk control behavior might differ from that of most firms
 in other developed countries. It is interesting to observe the way in which Chinese
 companies adjust their debt ratio as they face variations in business risk.
 Our paper extends that of Huang and Song (2006) regarding the association between
 state ownership or institutional ownership and capital structure by incorporating the
 KMV model (proposed by S. Kealhofer, J. A. Mcquown, and O. A. Vasicek in 1989,
 denominated KMV hereafter) into our specification and examining further group samples
 in terms of leverage and firm size. We demonstrate that the influences of state ownership
 and institution ownership are commonly apparent in high-leveraged companies, and in
 particular, that the effects are significantly positive and only occur in large firms.
 This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review past studies and set
 up our hypotheses on the impact of state ownership, institutional ownership, and default
 risk on a firm's capital structure. Section three defines the variables and describes the
 empirical method, and in Section four, the data are described and the main empirical
 results presented. Finally, Section five concludes the paper.
 LITERATURE REVIEW
 Regarding risk, China is one of Asia's emerging markets. Firms in China, like those in
 other countries in the emerging markets, face more risk and suffer higher distress
 probabilities when they have higher leverage ratios. However, on the other hand, firms in
 China might face less risk in terms of a financial crisis because the government is the
 controlling shareholder for most firms. Therefore, the business risk of Chinese firms may
 have a much smaller effect on the capital structure compared to firms that are not
 state-owned (Huang and Song, 2006). When considering the impact of business risk on
 the capital structure, previous literature almost invariably uses the standard deviation of
 earnings as a proxy, as in Booth et al. (200 l)j however, this might overestimate business
 risk and hence might not be a good proxy. In this study we consider the impact of
 expected default risk, as it is commonly believed that the extent of leverage is associated
 with a firm's credit rating, and hence direct estimation of the probabilities of default is
 more accurate than the standard deviation of earnings used in previous studies. Zou and
 Adams (2005) indicate that firms with high state ownership bring about higher credit
 risks as the loan repayment schedules are not guaranteed, while Kisgen (2006) finds that
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 in contrast with a firm not close to a change in credit rating, those that are close to an
 upgrade or downgrade issue less debt in response to credit rating.
 To sum up the above, the relationship between capital structure and credit risk is
 apparent, which prompts us to consider expected default risk rather than business risk in
 terms of the standard deviation of the return on assets. To the best of our knowledge,
 however, there has been little research into the effects of expected default risk on capital
 structure. Consequently, in this study we substitute the expected default risk for the
 standard deviation as a proxy for business risk. Moreover, in most of the previous
 literature, the expected default risk has been assessed on the basis of accounting using a
 linear probability model, such as the probit model or the logit model. Alternatively, the
 discriminated analysis model and/or neural network model have also been applied in
 prior studies.5 However, most previous studies use the logit model to estimate the default
 risk probability given the business risk (in terms of the standard deviation of earnings)
 and other factors. Previous research on the impact of business risk on leverage generally
 uses volatility as a proxy, as in Titman and Wessels (1988), Wald (1999), and Booth et al.
 (2001). Most of these studies indicate that business risk or volatility is negatively related
 to leverage, the only exception being Hsia (1981), who identifies a positive relationship
 between business risk and leverage.
 In order to mitigate the measurement error, we directly estimate the probabilities of
 expected default using the KMV model, which is expected to provide a better estimation
 of risk than other indicators, for example, the standard deviation of earnings, or the
 percentage change in operating income, and so on. The reason for adopting the KMV
 model is the greater prediction power of that model in comparison with Moody's Risk
 Calc. model, as assessed by Oderda and Jung (2003), who report that the KMV model has
 the advantages of an instantaneous (no time lag) and better prediction power. As a result,
 instead of using the standard deviation of earnings as in previous research, in this study
 we consider default risk using the KMV model. Lastly, it is likely that the relationship
 between expected default risk and leverage is positive, because China's economy has
 exhibited high growth in recent years, and enterprises anticipate excellent prospects. That
 is to say, Chinese firms tend to raise debt ratios even if they expect to face higher default
 risk the next year. In our study, we indeed find evidence of this positive relationship,
 which might be attributable to the state-owned characteristic of Chinese firms. We also
 find that Chinese firms with higher expected default risk have more leverage, a trait that
 is not present in the firms of other countries.
 As for state-owned enterprises (SOE), most Chinese firms are state-owned, and the
 agency cost of equity might rise due to the possibility of expropriation by the controlling
 shareholders (state ownership) as well as their negligence in terms of monitoring
 managers. Firms with an ownership concentration, such as state-owned enterprises, often
 experience a divergence between cash flow rights and control rights, which could cause
 shareholder—manager interest conflicts (Berkman et al., 2002). In order to reduce the
 agency cost of equity, firms should increase their debt financing. In addition, a firm's
 degree of leverage might increase with the government's support and provision of a
 government guarantee. The non-dilution motive leads to the use of more debt by firms
 with a large divergence between cash flow rights and control rights (Du and Dai, 2005).
 The extent of state ownership is therefore expected to be positively related to leverage
 (leverage-increasing effects). Berger et al. (1997) confirmed the positive relationship
 between managerial shareholdings and leverage. On the contrary, the
 reduce-debt-for-tunneling effect, however, predicts leverage-decreasing effects, for the
 reason that earnings are needed for debt repayment if firms raise more debt, and thereby
 the probability of expropriation (tunnelling) is reduced (Du and Dai, 2005). Friend and
 Lang (1988) find a negative relationship between the two, but Both Huang and Song
 (2006) and Zou and Xiao (2006) indicate that the relationship between the extent of state
 ownership and leverage is not significant. To sum up, the relationship between the extent
 of management by shareholders and leverage is still disputed.
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 Another factor that might affect the extent of leverage is the institutional
 shareholdings. In general, when more shares are owned by institutions, the monitoring of
 managers is more effective and hence can raise a firm's value, which accordingly results
 in equity prevailing over debt as a financing channel. Mohd et al. (1998) indicate that
 institutional shareholdings have a significant negative impact on leverage. However,
 Berger et al. (1997) demonstrate a positive relationship between ownership structure and
 leverage, so that the agency costs of equity are minimized, which is advocated by agency
 theory (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast to the findings of Mohd et al. (1998)
 and Berger et al. (1997), both Huang and Song (2006) and Zou and Xiao (2006) are
 unable to find evidence of a significant relationship between institutional shareholdings
 and leverage in Chinese firms. Due to the unclear empirical results regarding the impact
 of state and institutional ownership on a firm's leverage, we accordingly have no prior
 expected sign for leverage.
 In comparison with the abundance of studies on the determinants of capital structure
 in developed markets, few focus on developing countries. However, Wiwattanakantang
 (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Zou and Xiao (2006), and Huang and Song (2006) study the
 determinants of capital structure in emerging markets. Specifically, Huang and Song
 (2006) find that the higher the leverage of firms, the larger their size, as well as their
 fixed assets, and also that the higher the leverage, the lower the profitability, as well as
 the growth opportunities, among Chinese firms. In particular, they find no significant
 evidence that state ownership and institutional ownership are correlated with leverage,
 and report that Chinese firms do not prefer long-term debt. Our paper differs from those
 of Huang and Song (2006) and Zou and Xiao (2006) in that we adopt a different proxy
 for business risk, estimating the expected default risk using the KMV model rather than
 using the standard deviation of earnings.
 Another discrepancy is the empirical methodology. In contrast to the studies of
 Huang and Song (2006) and Zou and Xiao (2006), the panel data regression model is
 used in our study rather than the traditional OLS regression model. In addition, for further
 investigation, we divide our sample into various sub-samples on the basis of leverage and
 firm size, which is not the case in the studies by Huang and Song and Zou and Xiao.
 Unlike previous studies, we not only substitute expected default risk for the standard
 deviation, but also discuss smaller sub-sample groups using panel data regression, which
 allows us to address some of the puzzles raised by prior studies. In so doing, we mainly
 find that the expected default probability is positively associated with leverage in Chinese
 firms, whereas most previous studies including Huang and Song (2006) and Zou and
 Xiao (2006) depict evidence of a negative relationship between the two.6 We believe that
 our results are more reliable than those of Huang and Song at this point because the
 correlation coefficients between them are both positive:7 that is, Chinese firms with a
 higher expected default risk usually raise more debt. This finding might be a unique
 characteristic of Chinese firms and deserves to be noted. Another finding from this study
 is that the impact of state ownership and institutional ownership on leverage mostly
 occurs in highly-leveraged firms, which contributes to the literature.
 VARIABLES DEFINITIONS AND EMPRICAL MODELS
 The (long-term) leverage used in this study is defined as the ratio of the book value of
 (long-term) total debt to the book value of total assets. Huang and Song (2006) employ
 various definitions of leverage, including the total and long-term debt ratios in terms of
 book value and market value, respectively. However, they find that there are no
 significant differences among them. Consequently, we mainly use the ratio of the book
 value of total debt to the book value of total assets as our dependent variable (D/A) and
 the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book value of total assets (LD/A) for
 our robustness check. Another reason we take the long-term debt ratio into account is
 based on the work of Wald (1999), in which the author asserts that the long-term debt
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 ratio is a more stable measurement for a firm's capital structure than the total debt ratio.
 Moreover, based on the work of Raj an and Zingales (1995), it is found that firm size is
 positively associated with the debt/assets ratio due to the larger firm having lower
 bankruptcy costs. Accordingly, the highly-leveraged firms, in turn, are divided into
 full-sample firms, large-scale firms and small-scale firms, based on the median of the
 total assets, and the firms with low levels of leverage are divided in the same way.
 Specifically, we attempt to examine the impact of a variety of firm sizes on the capital
 structure. Therefore, we have a total of 14 cases in our empirical study.
 Independent Variables
 State Ownership and Institutional Ownership
 In our study, the state ownership is defined as the proportion of shares owned by the
 government and the institutional ownership is measured as the ratio of shares owned to
 outstanding shares by the domestic, foreign, and founding institution investors.
 Expected Default Risk
 According to the viewpoint of Spano (2004), because the marketable risk, which include
 the currency, interest rate or commodity price risks, affects the risk of default, the reason
 for risk control motivates firm's manager to change financial decisions for the sake of
 avoiding the costly bankruptcy. Given the relevant, this paper adopts the KMV model to
 evaluate the default stake and to investigate the variation of debt decision. The model
 derives the actual probability of default dependent upon the option pricing theory of
 Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). It can effectively measure the probability
 of future bankruptcy.8 The estimated process involved in deriving the EDF is explained in
 Appendix.
 Other Control Variables
 To isolate the effects of both ownerships structure and default risk on firm capital
 structure, this paper controls some relevant variables. These variables have been shown in
 other contexts to affect firm capital structure and financial behaviors. Such variables
 include firm profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, and intangible assets.
 Firm Profitability
 It is generally assumed that a firm with high earnings might have higher leverage because
 the firm can obtain a tax-shield gain due to the deductions based on debts. That is, the
 leverage is positively related to the earnings (Williamson, 1988). However, Myers and
 Majluf (1984) confirmed the negative relationship and found support for the pecking
 order hypothesis. More recently researches, Huang and Song (2006), Zou and Xiao
 (2006), Rao et al. (2007) and Gunasekarage et al. (2007) also found a negative
 relationship between lending and profitability. In our study, we use the ROA (defined as
 earnings before tax divided by total assets) as a proxy for profitability to study the
 relationship with the leverage, and a negative relationship between them is hypothesized.
 Firm Size
 In views of the bankruptcy cost and credit rating, firm size is expected to have a positive
 relationship with leverage (see, e.g., Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1999; Booth et al., 2001;
 Huang and Song, 2006). In addition, from the perspective of asymmetric information,
 Rajan and Zingales (1995) also argue a positive relationship between firm size and
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 leverage. Therefore, we define firm size in terms of the natural logarithm of total assets,
 and a positive relationship is hypothesized in this study based on the empirical results of
 most of the previous studies.
 Growth Opportunities
 A high-growth firms might be reluctant to lend more and be inclined to issue equity due
 to the debt covenants resulting in underinvestment problem.9 Moreover, from the
 perspectives of agency cost of debt and the pecking order theory, the growth
 opportunities are expected to have a negative relationship with the leverage (see, e.g.,
 Huang and Song, 2006; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Booth et al., 2001; Wald, 1999).1
 consequently, this study measure the growth opportunities using the market to book ratio
 of equity and hypothesize that a high-growth firm should borrow less.
 Tangible Assets
 The tangible assets can be meant that the firm has a lower probability of default risk. If
 the statement is true, the lender should have a tendency to lend more, and the agency cost
 of debt resulting from the increased debt can be reduced because the firm provides
 enough collateral. In this study, we expect that the tangible assets should be positively
 associated with leverage (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984, Harris and Raviv, 1990, Zou
 and Xiao, 2006). In contrast, because more collateral can decrease the problem of
 information asymmetry, firms should tend to issue equity. To solve the ambiguous
 problem, the fixed assets and the inventory together and divide the combined amount by
 total assets as a proxy for the tangible assets is also examined in our study, and a positive
 relationship is hypothesized.
 Regression Models
 As for the independent variables, we include year dummies (DY), profitability (ROA),
 size (SIZE), growth opportunities (MB), tangibility (TAN), expected default risk (EDF),
 state ownership (GOVR), and institutional shareholding (INST) in this study.
 Furthermore, for both the debt/assets ratio and long-term debt/assets ratio, we firstly
 divide our samples into two sub-samples, namely, full sample firms and
 high/low-leverage sample firms (based on the median of leverage). The reasons why we
 divide our sample firms into high/low-leverage firms mainly based on the formal
 theoretical model, which maximize the firm's value, derived in the paper by Fattouth et al.
 (2005). They indicated that the impact of determinants (e.g. firm size) on the level of
 leverage is nonlinearities, arising from asymmetric information. This finding provides us
 the rationale to separately discuss the highly-leverage firms and firms with low leverage.
 Another reason that forces us to focus on the highly-leverage firms is the firms with
 higher leverage usually cause larger possibilities to financial distress. In addition, Ofek
 (1993) also indicated that high/low-leverage firms respond different in the face of poor
 performance regarding leverage decision.
 This study uses panel data regression, which combines cross sectional and time series
 data, to study the relationships among capital structure and key variables in Chinese firms.
 The advantages of panel data over cross-sectional or time series data are that they are
 capable of studying dynamic behavior and taking individual firm heterogeneity into
 account, besides increasing the sample size and having more degrees of freedom and
 more efficiency. In addition, the panel data regression can also increase the variation in
 the explanatory variables due to larger number of observations included and it can also
 mitigate or overcome the biases resulting from the omitted variables. The basic regression
 specification employed is as follows:
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 05 (\ \
 D,,/A„ = ][>,DY, +P0ROA,, +PIS1ZE„ + P2MB„ +P,TANit +PJEDF„ + p5GOVR,, +P„INST„ +6, U)
 i=02
 LD„/A„ = j? a'DY, + poROAit + P.SIZE,, + P2MB„ + P3TANit + P4EDF„ + P5GOVR,, + P6INST„ + »it (2)
 i=02
 where DY, ROA, SIZE, MB,TAN, EDF, GOVR, INST denote the year dummies, firm
 performance, firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility, expected default risk, state
 ownership, and institutional ownership, respectively.
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
 We conduct our analysis with the Chinese listed companies over the 2002 to 2005 sample
 period. In fact, the sample period for which we collect data extends from 2000 to 2005,
 which allows us to calculate the ROA for the previous three years. When estimating the
 expected default risk on the basis of market value, it is used to estimate the annual
 standard deviation of the ROA by the moving window method. After eliminating
 omission data, there are 767 listed firms included (financial firms are excluded) and all
 variables used in this study are collected and compiled from the China Stock Market and
 Accounting Research Database (CSMAR)."
 Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1. As revealed by Table
 1, the variance of the leverage ratio is somewhat larger for both the debt/assets ratio and
 the long-term debt/assets ratio. That is to say, the extent of debt financing differs among
 Chinese firms. In addition, that the long-term debt/assets ratio is less than the total
 debt/assets ratio confirms the observation of Chen (2004). In other words, Chinese firms
 in general do not prefer long-term debt.12 As for the profitability and growth opportunities,
 the performance of Chinese firms is quite different due to the large standard deviation
 observed. In the correlation analysis, we found that profitability and the leverage ratio
 exhibit a significantly negative relationship. This confirms the pecking order hypothesis.
 A significant negative correlation between the firm size and leverage ratio is also found,
 which supports the view of asymmetric information. A significant positive correlation
 appears between the expected default risk and leverage ratio, which suggests that Chinese
 firms with higher business risk tend to resort to debt financing. It is also noted that the
 highly significant correlation (-0.885) between state ownership and institutional
 ownership could be a potential problem in the regression analysis.
 The full-sample results are reported in Table 2 and represent the debt and assets ratio
 equation and long-term debt and assets equation, respectively. Furthermore, the high and
 low leverage results are separately shown in Table 3. In Table 2, the entire year dummies
 are positive and significant at the 5% level, which indicates that the leverage is increasing
 with each year. However, the phenomenon appears to exist in the firms with a low degree
 of leverage only, which is evidenced from Tables 4 and 5, in which each Table contains
 four parts, including the total debt ratio/small-scale firm sample, the total debt
 ratio/large-scale firm sample, the long-term debt ratio/small-scale firm sample, and the
 long-term debt ratio/large-scale firm sample. This accordingly might imply that Chinese
 firms still appear to depend on debt financing even though the capital market in China is
 gradually maturing.
 Regarding profitability, the negatively significant coefficient shown in Table 2 is
 consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, which is also confirmed in Titman and
 Wessels (1988), Friend and Lang (1988), Wald (1999), Brailsford et al. (2002), and
 Huang and Song (2006). However, for the long-term debt part, a profitable firm is
 predicted to raise more long-term debt. This is consistent with the predictions of
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 TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 Variables  Mean  S.D.  Mill  Max
 D/A  0.5369  0.8176  0.0000  43.0754
 LD/A  0.3043  0.7956  0.0000  43.0754
 ROA  -0.0023  0.2512  -8.7534  0.4570
 SIZE  21.2026  0.9311  17.1219  24.7761
 MB  3.4338  9.5049  -201.1393  306.1472
 TAN  0.3937  0.2005  0.0000  0.9533
 EDF  0.0125  0.0847  0.0000  1.0000
 GOVR  0.3028  0.2605  0.0000  0.8858
 INST  0.2809  0.2557  0.0000  0.8638
 Notes: The definitions for each variable are as follows: total debt/assets (D/A), long-term
 debt/assets (LD/A), profitability (ROA), size (SIZE), growth opportunities (MB),
 tangibility (TAN), expected default risk (EDF), state ownership (GOVR), and institutional
 shareholding (INST).
 tax-based models, and might suggest that a profitable firm in China usually finances its
 investment with long-term debt. In order to investigate this in more detail, we move to
 high/low leverage firm cases in Table 3. The empirical results for the total debt ratio
 panels are more stable relative to those of the long-term debt ratio panels. For most total
 debt ratio panels, there are still significant negative signs on the coefficients, but for the
 long-term debt ratio panels, the signs appear mixed.
 For firms with high leverage, there is less debt as they earn more regardless of what
 the firm's size is. The mixed results occur in the firms with low leverage, in which
 large-sized firms have less debt as they have more earnings. By contrast, small-sized
 firms have more long-term debt as they have more earnings. So, for the long-term debt
 part, we can argue that the positive sign obtained in Table 2 in fact is mainly dominated
 by the small-scale firms with little leverage. Intuitively, the small-scale firms with little
 leverage, when faced with markets characterized by high demand, tend to finance their
 long-term investment projects with debt financing in order to expand their capacity
 themselves when they have made more profits. Thus we can also say that in China a
 small-scale firm with low leverage may have a tendency toward more long-term debt due
 to the incentive to have a tax shield, but that this is not die case with a large-scale firm.
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 TABLE 2. THE REGRESSIVE RESULTS FROM TOTAL LIABILITY AND
 LONG-TERM DEBT IN FULL SAMPLE
 Variables  Total Debt  Long Term Debt
 dy02
 0.0719"  0.0499
 (0.0320)  (0.0315)
 dy03
 0.1472*"  0.0998***
 (0.0334)  (0.0328)
 dym
 0.1942"*  0.1339***
 (0.0351)  (0.0346)
 dy05
 0.2751"*  0.1951*"
 (0.0367)  (0.0361)
 roajt
 -0.1658***  0.1892***
 (0.0622)  (0.0612)
 SIZEit
 -0.5169***  -0.3997*"
 (0.0518)  (0.0510)
 mb„
 -0.0012  0.0012
 (0.0012)  (0.0012)
 TANit
 -0.2100
 (0.1561)
 -0.1063
 (0.1537)
 EDFj,
 1.6838***  1.4746***
 (0.2033)  (0.2003)
 GOVR„
 -0.4538
 (0.3570)
 -0.4321
 (0.3517)
 INSTit
 -0.4475
 (0.3492)
 -0.4283
 (0.3440)
 R sq. adj.  0.4266  0.4123
 Numbers  767
 ** Significant at eht 5 percent level.
 *** Significant at eht 1 percent level.
 Notes: The estimated standard errors are shown in the parentheses,
 and the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect prevails.
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 TABLE 3. THE REGRESSIVE RESULTS FROM HIGH- AND LOW- LEVERAGE
 IN FULL SAMPLE
 High Leverage  Low Leverage
 Variables  Total Liability
 Long Term
 Debt  Total Liability
 Long Term
 Debt
 dy02
 -0.0048  -0.0069  0.1200"*  0.0814
 (0.0059)  (0.0062)  (0.0512)  (0.0508)
 dy03
 -0.0221*"  -0.0288***  0.2635***  0.1786*"
 (0.0061)  (0.0064)  (0.0538)  (0.0534)
 dy(m
 -0.0297*"  -0.0397***  0.3456***  0.2374***
 (0.0065)  (0.0068)  (0.0567)  (0.0563)
 dy05
 -0.0357*"  -0.0393*"  0.4784***  0.3404***
 (0.0067)  (0.0071)  (0.0594)  (0.0590)
 ROA„
 -0.4934***  -0.5437***  -0.1555*  0.2123***
 (0.0382)  (0.0401)  (0.0794)  (0.0788)
 SIZE,,
 0.1503***  0.2329***  -0.8120*"  -0.6164***
 (0.0119)  (0.0125)  (0.0762)  (0.0755)
 MBit
 0.0005  0.0010  -0.0007  0.0018
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0016)  (0.0015)
 TAN,,
 0.0557  0.0361  -0.3597  -0.2270
 (0.0297)  (0.0312)  (0.2458)  (0.2439)
 EDFit
 0.5512***  0.6906***  1.3420***  1.2529***
 (0.1889)  ((0.1982)  (0.2636)  (0.2615)
 GOVR„
 0.2929***  0.4763*"  -1.0162  -0.8803
 (0.0632)  (0.0663)  (0.5889)  (0.5842)
 INST,,
 0.3459*"  0.5712*"  -1.1403  -0.9482
 (0.0610)  (0.0640)  (0.5823)  (0.5777)
 Rsq. adj. 0.8697 0.7390 0.4200 0.4030
 Numbers 296 296 471 471
 ** Significant at eht 5percent level.
 *** Significant at eht 1 percent level.
 Notes: The estimated standard errors are shown in the parentheses,
 and the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect prevails.
 The negative sign with regard to the size of the firm is different from that in most
 earlier studies such as Agrawal and Nagarajan (1999), Booth et al. (2001), and Huang and
 Song (2006). However, finance theories also predict the negative sign in regard to size
 based on the concept of asymmetric information. A larger firm should reveal more
 information to the general investors (outside investors) and hence the firms' financial
 statements will tend to be more transparent. Consequently, a larger firm should use more
 debt financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). It is, nonetheless, found that a significant
 positive sign appears in the case of the highly-leveraged firms, which meets the
 bankruptcy cost hypothesis and is confirmed by Agrawal and Nagarajan (1999), Booth et
 al. (2001), and Huang and Song (2006). The new finding from our study is that the
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 bankruptcy cost hypothesis only holds for most highly-leveraged firms and large-scale
 firms with low levels of leverage.
 As for growth opportunities and tangibility, no significant coefficients are found in
 Table 2, a result which is similar to the finding in regard to tangibility in Huang and Song
 (2006). It seems that the Chinese firms' capital structure is not affected by growth
 opportunities and tangibility. However, as we switch to the sub-sample results in Tables 4
 and 5, growth opportunities seldom have a significant effect on the leverage except for a
 positive sign on the large-scale firms with low levels of leverage and firms with high
 levels of leverage, which is consistent with the finding of Kester (1986), but is contrary to
 the finding of Huang and Song (2006) as well as Zou and Xiao (2006). In our study, as
 for tangibility, most large-scale firms account for the positive effect, especially for the
 firms with low leverage. We thus conclude that the positive effect observed in most of the
 earlier studies, such as Myers and Majluf (1984), and Harris and Raviv (1990), is only
 observed in the large-sized firms. As for growth opportunities, the positive effect found
 here might result from the inefficiency on the Chinese stock market and thereby have
 more information asymmetry exists between outside investors and managers and hence
 use more debt and issue less equity. Tangibility effect is rather mixed. The only consistent
 result found in our study is the positive effect of large firms with low leverage. This
 finding support the agency cost of debt. Our findings suggest that Chinese firms do not
 support the pecking order hypothesis for growth opportunities but support the asymmetric
 information.
 With regard to the impact of the expected default risk, a positive sign prevails on the
 expected default risk coefficient in almost all sample cases. This might imply that the
 higher the default probability, the higher will be the leverage (this is confirmed by the
 positive correlation coefficient). We find the positive effect is found in the small firms
 with high leverage and large firms with low leverage. This finding is consistent with that
 of Hsia (1981), but is contrary to the work of Huang and Song. It should be noted that
 Chinese firms have this sole characteristic, which is hardly ever found in other countries
 including developing countries.
 As for state ownership and institutional ownership in terms of the full sample, no
 significant impact is found on the capital structure, which is consistent with the finding of
 Huang and Song (2006) as well as Zou and Xiao (2006). However, when we switch to the
 highly-leveraged firms, all of the institutional ownership appears to be highly positively
 significant at the 1% level regardless of the full sample firms or sub-sample firms. As for
 the firms with low levels of leverage, only in large-scale firms does the institutional
 ownership appear to have a significantly positive impact on the leverage decision. In
 general, people do believe that the more a firm's share is owned by the institutions, the
 better credit or performance the firm has (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Pound, 1991). It
 would probably be helpful for firms to borrow more from bond markets or financial
 institutions. As for state ownership, we also find that this variable has a positive impact
 on the leverage of highly-leveraged firms regardless of whether they are full-sample
 firms or sub-sample firms.
 On the contrary, for the firms with low levels of leverage, only large scale firms
 appear to have a highly significant positive impact on the total debt ratio. This finding is
 consistent with that of Berger et al. (1997), which indicates that Chinese firms that are
 large in size have a tendency to reduce their agency cost of equity by raising more debt.
 This implies that either a high degree of state ownership or institutional ownership can
 help to advance the leverage capacity of firms through both the guarantee provided by the
 government and increased monitoring on the part of institutional investors. For these two
 factors, we discover that the impact of the state ownership as well as institutional
 ownership on the leverage is mostly felt by the highly-leveraged firms, and hence we
 experience a measure of success in solving the puzzle that has existed in the studies by
 Huang and Song as well as Zou and Xiao.
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 TABLE 4. THE REGRESSIVE RESULTS FROM LARGE- AND SMALL- FIRMS
 IN THE GROUP OF HIGH LEVERAGE
 Total Liability  Long Term Debt
 Variables  Large firms  Small firms  Large firms  Small firms
 dy02
 0.0056  0.0019  0.0112  0.0019
 (0.0070)  (0.0102)  (0.0067)  (0.0097)
 dy03
 -0.0141  -0.0142  0.0061  -0.0196"
 (0.0078)  (0.0102)  (0.0075)  (0.0098)
 dym
 -0.0108  -0.0284***  0.0105  -0.0278***
 (0.0090)  (0.0104)  (0.0086)  (0.0100)
 dy05
 -0.0097  -0.0191  0.0059  -0.0257*"
 (0.0097)  (0.0109)  (0.0094)  (0.0104)
 ROAit
 -0.8083*"  -0.4248***  -0.6263*"  -0.3840***
 (0.0697)  (0.0553)  (0.0671)  (0.0530)
 SIZE,
 0.2383*"  0.2589***  0.1465***  0.1713***
 (0.0142)  (0.0213)  (0.0137)  (0.0204)
 MBit
 0.0298"*  0.0005  0.0274***  0.0002***
 (0.0027)  (0.0007)  (0.0026)  (0.0006)
 TANit
 0.0595
 (0.0378)
 0.0648
 (0.0468)
 0.0417
 (0.0363)
 0.1056"
 (0.0448)
 EDF„
 0.0063
 (0.1928)
 1.7994"*
 (0.3799)
 -0.1873
 (0.1853)
 1.8030*"
 (0.3637)
 govrit
 0.2589*"
 (0.0578)
 1.0616***
 (0.1868)
 0.1022
 (0.0555)
 0.7161"*
 (0.1788)
 INSTit
 0.3434*"
 (0.0550)
 1.1774"*
 (0.1885)
 0.1597***
 (0.0529)
 0.7690***
 (0.1805)
 Rsq. adj.  0.7934  0.7420  0.9035  0.8608
 Numbers  158  138  158  138
 ** Significant at eht 5 percent level.
 *** Significant at eht 1 percent level.
 Notes: The estimated standard errors are shown in the parentheses,
 and the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect prevails.
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 TABLE 5. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM LARGE- AND SMALL- FIRMS
 IN THE GROUP OF LOW LEVERAGE
 Total Debt  Long Term Debt
 Variables  Large firms  Small firms  Large firms  Small firms
 dy02
 0.0093  0.1607  -0.0050  0.1123
 (0.0049)  (0.1195)  (0.0055)  (0.1211)
 dy03
 0.0223*"  0.3343***  0.0017  0.2194
 (0.0054)  (0.1223)  (0.0061)  (0.1240)
 dym
 0.0271*"  0.3767***  0.0005  0.2502**
 (0.0060)  (0.1237)  (0.0068)  (0.1254)
 dy05
 0.0445*"
 _ __ _ _*♦»
 0.5242  -2.8E-06  0.3811*"
 (0.0067)  (0.1275)  (0.0075)  (0.1293)
 ROAjt
 -0.5964*"  -0.0592  -0.3471***  0.2889***
 (0.0429)  (0.1220)  (0.0484)  (0.1237)
 SIZE,,
 0.1668***  -1.9860*"
 . ,4 ♦♦♦
 0.1177  -1.5017***
 (0.0081)  (0.1770)  (0.0091)  (0.1794)
 mb,,
 0.0034***  0.0005  0.0014  0.0028
 (0.0008)  (0.0024)  (0.0009)  (0.0024)
 TAN,,
 0.1106*"  -1.1829"  0.1793***  -0.8922
 (0.0255)  (0.5150)  (0.0288)  (0.5220)
 EDFit
 0.4780***
 (0.0674)
 0.6676
 (0.4251)
 0.3586"*
 (0.0761)
 0.7515
 (0.4309)
 govrit
 0.2489***  -3.0405  0.0734  -2.1528
 (0.0439)  (4.7846)  (0.0496)  (4.8499)
 INST;,
 0.2773*"
 (0.0435)
 -3.1102
 (4.8118)
 0.0967"
 (0.0491)
 -2.0916
 (4.8775)
 R sq. adj.  0.8328  0.4641  0.9463  0.4064
 Numbers  280  191  280  191
 ** Significant at eht 5 percent level.
 *** Significant at eht 1 percent level.
 Notes: The estimated standard errors are shown in the parentheses,
 and the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect prevails.
 To sum up, as for the effect of profitability on the firm's leverage, we answer the
 puzzle in the previous literature. Specifically, the tax shield hypothesis only holds in the
 case of the long-term debt ratio of firms with low levels of leverage that are small in size
 whereas the highly-leveraged firms go counter to the tax shield hypothesis while being
 supported by the pecking order hypothesis. As for the size effect, a new finding in our
 study is that the bankruptcy cost hypothesis only holds for most highly-leveraged firms,
 and only large-scale firms that have low levels of leverage. As regards the growth
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 opportunities, our findings suggest that Chinese firms do not support the pecking order
 hypothesis. Moreover, we also find that the higher the expected default risk, the more
 leverage that will exist in Chinese firms. This finding is contrary to the work of Huang
 and Song (2006) as well as Zou and Xiao (2006), which also examine the Chinese firms'
 capital structures. In addition, we succeed in finding that the effects of state ownership
 and institutional ownership on the leverage of firms are mostly felt only in the cases of
 the highly-leveraged firms. As for leverage choices, the impacts of determinants on
 high/low leverage firms are divergent, which is consistent with predictions based on the
 theoretical model in the Fattouth et al. (2005).
 CONCLUSIONS
 This paper aims to examine that the impact of state ownership as well as institutional
 ownership on the leverage decision in Chinese listed companies. Our results show that
 the effects are only significant in the case of large-sized firms. In addition, a positively
 significant relationship is found between expected default risk and the debt/assets ratio, a
 finding rarely observed in other studies. Why do Chinese firms have this special
 characteristic? It is probably because the government is still the controlling shareholder in
 most Chinese firms. An over-investment or an investment with negative net returns based
 on debt financing might arise due to the forgetfulness of the controlling shareholder in
 monitoring the managers.13 Consequently, the firms might take a chance on a highly-risky
 investment or a bad investment, and as a result experience a loss of assets. Moreover, our
 results also confirm that a Chinese firm with high expected default risk is usually
 highly-leveraged. The credit rating might not be closing to the threshold of an upgrade or
 a downgrade. In particular, large firms with highly-leveraged firms tend to have a more
 debt financing and highly-leveraged firms usually reduce their debt ratio when they make
 more money.
 Several policy implications may be derived from our empirical results. Firstly, the
 firms with highly leverage are generally vulnerable to financial distress or economic
 shocks, then in an attempt to reduce debt ratios becomes a goal of China industiy policy.
 In so doing, the first target should be the firms with small scale, but for those highly
 leverage firms, large size firms become first priority instead. In addition, a highly
 leverage firm with low earnings could be another target as the firm tends to have higher
 leverage. The firms with highly state ownership or highly institutional ownership have a
 propensity towards using high leverage. In an attempt to reduce the degrees of leverage,
 the firms with highly state ownership or highly institutional ownership should also be
 considered as a target when the government makes related policies.
 ENDNOTES
 1 Notice that a higher degree of leverage might give rise to a higher agency cost of debt.
 2 The models used in Bradley et al. (1984), Diamond (1989), Chang (1999), and Stulz (1990) are
 based on the static trade-off model, whereas Brennan and Kraus (1987), Narayanan (1988), and
 Heinkel and Zechner (1990) follow the pecking order model proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984).
 3 The static trade-off model predicts the trade-off between benefits and costs debt financing. The
 costs of debt financing include bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt and the benefits of debt
 financing consist of tax-shield gain and effective monitoring on the managers resulting in decreases
 in agent costs (Zou and Xiao, 2006; Myers, 1977). The pecking order hypothesis argues that the
 higher asymmetry information, the higher agency costs of equity.
 4 The standard deviation, by definition, includes positive and negative volatility effects. From the
 viewpoint of risk, the negative shock should be more of a concern than a positive one. Moreover,
 the standard deviation accounts for total risk, but the expected default risk is in response to
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 financial risk.
 5 As for measuring the expected default risk, Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Altman et al. (1994)
 have previously used discriminant analysis, the logit model, and the neural network model,
 respectively.
 6 It is, nonetheless, note that the standard deviation of earnings used in Huang and Song (2006) as
 well as Zou and Xiao (2006) rather than expected default risk.
 7 The correlation coefficient between the debt/assets ratio (the long term debt/assets ratio) and
 default risk is 0.481 (0.335) at the 1% significance level.
 8 Bharath and Shumway (2004) suggested the use of the option pricing model, incorporating the
 volatility of the firms' assets, as a better approach to forecasting the financial risk of a firm. Hao
 (2006) found that the standard call-option approach significantly out-performed the other models,
 whilst Hillegeist et al. (2004) further demonstrated that the market-based model was capable of
 providing more information than the accounting-based model.
 Another reason for a negative relation arises from the asset substitution effect (Titman and
 Wessels, 1988).
 10 For a firm lacking investment opportunities, debt financing can prevent managers from engaging
 in privileged consumption.
 11 In China, to date, tradable shares comprise about 60% of shares of Chinese-listed firms.
 Furthermore, the percentage of tradable shares is still going up over time. In other words, the
 number of tradable shares is increasing.
 12 Zou and Xiao (2006) indicated that three reasons of lower in the long-term debt ratio in China.
 One of the reasons is to decrease credit risk for banks.
 13 The debt financing arises mainly from the banking rather than the bond market due to the
 immature bond market in China.
 APPENDIX
 We use the KMV model - a model developed by the KMV Company in 1993 - to
 estimate and measure the default risk for the firms used in this study. The KMV model
 calculates the 'expected default frequency' (EDF) based on the firm's capital structure,
 the volatility of the asset returns, and the current asset value in accordance with the
 option pricing model of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). This model is best
 applied to publicly-traded companies for which the value of equity is determined by the
 market.
 There are three steps involved in deriving the actual probability of default. Firstly,
 we estimate the asset value and the volatility of the asset returns. Financial models
 usually consider the market value of assets, not the book value, since the latter represents
 only the historical cost of the physical assets, net of depreciation. Secondly, we calculate
 the default point. According to the KMV model, default occurs when the asset value
 reaches a level somewhere between the values of total liabilities and short-term debt. This
 point, which is referred to as the default point (DPT), is considered within the KMV
 model as the sum of the short-term debt plus half of the long-term debt. Thirdly, we
 calculate the 'distance to default' (DD), an index measure of default risk, which is the
 number of standard deviations between the mean of the distribution of the asset value and
 DPT. We then scale the DD to the actual probability of default using a default database.
 The estimation procedure is as follows.
 = udt + oAdZ. (1)
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 where VA is the total market value of the assets for the firm at time t for China; u is
 the expected rate of return; and oA is the volatility of the asset returns. Thus, we can
 state the above equation in accordance with the option pricing model as follows:
 VE=VAN(d1)-Xe^,N(d2) (2)
 d,=
 ln|^
 X
 + r, +
 J
 d2=di-oA>/t (3) > u2
 °E=TfN(dl)°A (4)
 where VA is the market value of assets for the firm listed in the China Stock Exchange;
 Vp is the equity market value for the Chinese listed company; oE represents the
 volatility of the equity returns; X is the book value of the total debt on the balance sheet; t
 represents the time to maturity of the debt; rf is the one-year risk-free rate in the central
 bank of China; N(dl) expresses the hedging ratio with a cumulative probability density
 function; N(d2) is the probability that the market value of assets are greater than the
 liability at maturity t, a cumulative density probability function.
 The implied market value and volatility of the asset, VA and oA , can be calculated
 from Equations (2) and (4). We also need to compute the 'distance to default' (DD).
 Given that the total debt is regarded as the default point (DPT) for the firm, after being
 standardized by the standard deviation of asset returns, its DD can be expressed as:
 DD = -
 ln| | — In  u
 oAVt
 (5)
 The implied default risk for any period t - that is, the probability that the market values of
 the assets will be lower than those of the liabilities at maturity - is measured in
 accordance with the risk-neutral method. The procedure is as follows:
 r  LX°A¥  ]v= [Pr'j^V (6)
 After being represented in compliance with the Ito Process, the market values of the
 assets can be expressed, in logarithmic form, as follows:
 lnV;=lnV°+(u —^t + a^s (7)
 where £ denotes a random factor of asset returns.
 We replace Equation (7) into Equation (6) after hypothesizing that the asset returns
 follow normal distribution. After arranging the related term, we obtain the default
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 probability EDFt, as follows:
 EDFt=Pr[v< <Xt|V°=VA]
 = Pi
 = Pr
 ln>H +^VtZt< In 3:
 In
 Z«<
 V
 •
 r, °*1 +  r
 L*..  2
 = N (ri (8)
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